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INFORMAL EPA ACTION UNDER CERCLA:
PROBLEMS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
Courts have played an important role1 in shaping the parameters of
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Lia-
bility Act of 1980 (CERCLA).2 Despite the judiciary's significant
role,3 the first meaningful review of informal Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) decisionmaking concerning hazardous substance4
cleanup activity may occur only when the EPA brings suit against a
potentially responsible party.5 Whether the suit is to enjoin the party
1. See generally Frank & Atkeson, Superfund: Litigation and Cleanup, 16 Env't.
Rep. I (BNA) (1985).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9657 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The Act is commonly referred
to as "Superfund."
3. Congress passed CERCLA with very little debate during the closing days of a
lame duck session. The legislative history demonstrates that the final statute was a
compromise of three different Superfund bills. Consequently, the courts were left to
answer many questions. See Frank & Atkeson, supra note 1, at 7; Grad, A Legislative
History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 1-2 (1982); Note, The Role of
Injunctive Relief and Settlements in Superfund Enforcement, 68 CORNELL L. RPv. 706,
710 (1983).
4. "Hazardous substance" is defined in § 101(14) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(14) (1982), as any substance, waste, or pollutant designated pursuant to
§§ 307(a) and 31 l(b)(2)(A) of the Clean Water Act, § 3001 of the Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act, § 112 of the Clean Air Act, or § 102 of CERCLA. Crude oil
and fractions thereof, natural gas, and liquefied natural gas are exempted from statutory
coverage. For the purposes of this article, the terms "hazardous substance" and "haz-
ardous waste" are synonymous.
5. See Anderson, Negotiation and Informal Agency Action: The Case of Superfund,
1985 DUKE L.J. 261, 314-19. Anderson states:
CERCLA's history in the courts presents a paradox. On the one hand, most of the
decisions that the EPA makes prior to suing for direct cleanup or reimbursement
involve various species of ill-defined informal agency action. Judicial review of
these actions will probably develop hesitantly and with less clarity and will proba-
bly be more restricted than review under typical welfare statutes. On the other
hand, the large number of pending enforcement and reimbursement actions sug-
gests that CERCLA is a thoroughly "judicialized" statute.
Id. at 314-15.
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to clean up a release6 or to seek reimbursement for government cleanup
costs,7 the EPA will have already made a series of informal decisions
that in many instances are both important and irreversible. This Re-
cent Development addresses the issues involved with judicial review of
informal EPA cleanup actions under CERCLA. Specifically, the arti-
cle addresses who can challenge EPA action or inaction, when a chal-
lenger is permitted to seek judicial review, and what type of relief is
available. Though the courts have generally provided consistent an-
swers to these questions, controversy exists over CERCLA's ability to
withstand constitutional due process challenges.
Before any cleanup activities occur the EPA must identify poten-
tially hazardous waste sites. As required by section 105 of CERCLA,8
the agency identifies and investigates potential sites in accordance with
the National Contingency Plan (NCP).9 Section 105(8) also charges
the EPA with establishing criteria for determining cleanup priorities
among hazardous waste release sites and formulating a National Pri-
orities List. 10 In coordination with other federal agencies, state and
local governments, and private entities, the EPA may conduct prelimi-
nary assessments of the site, ask other parties to begin investigations,
and send out "notice" letters11 to potentially responsible parties.12 A
potentially responsible party is anyone who may be liable in a cost re-
covery action under section 107(a).' 3
In order to fully comprehend the scope of judicial review problems
under CERCLA, one must consider the EPA's alternative cleanup ac-
tions under CERCLA. When the EPA decides that cleanup action is
6. See infra notes 30-71 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 72-87 and accompanying text.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1982).
9. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1-.86 (1986).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 9605(8) (1982); 40 C.F.R. § 300.66(e) (1986). See Eagle-Picher In-
dus., Inc. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 922 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (court upheld EPA inclusion of certain
mining and electric utility facilities on the National Priorities List).
11. Initially a notice letter was quite brief, specifying a party's suspected involve-
ment and providing an opportunity to voluntarily clean up the site. In 1983 the EPA
issued guidelines that suggested the notice letter contain more extensive information
about the EPA's evaluation of the site. See Anderson, supra note 5, at 289-90; Thomas
& Price, EPA Memorandum on Use and Issuance of Administrative Orders Under Sec-
tion 106(a) of CERCLA, reprinted in [Federal Laws] Env't Rep. (BNA) 41:2931 (1983).
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1982); 40 C.F.R. § 300.61-.71 (1986); Frank & Atkeson,
supra note 1, at 6-16.
13. For the list of those who may be found liable in a § 107(a) cost recovery action,
see infra note 73.
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needed, three basic options are available.14 First, the EPA can file suit
to obtain a court order forcing a responsible party to take necessary
action.15 Second, the EPA can issue an administrative order requiring
responsible parties to take appropriate action.16 Finally, the EPA can
expend money from the Hazardous Substance Response Fund
(Superfund)17 to clean up the site."8 Following any cleanup action by
the EPA, any responsible party may be liable for the cleanup costs
under section 107.19
II. PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
Some potentially responsible parties have sought judicial review of
informal EPA decisions made during the preliminary investigation of a
potentially hazardous waste site. In D'Imperio v. United States2 ° plain-
tiffs sought a declaratory judgment that they were not liable for
cleanup costs under CERCLA.2" The EPA had released 250,000 dol-
lars from Superfund for the purpose of studying a dumpsite owned by
14. The EPA's fourth option is a private settlement with a party that agrees to clean
up the site. This option is beyond the scope of this article. See Anderson, supra note 5;
Freedman, Summary Action by Administrative Agencies, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 35-38
(1972); Note, supra note 3.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1982). CERCLA § 104(a) refers to the "owner or opera-
tor" or "other responsible party" as the person to whom the EPA can look to determine
whether cleanup of a site will be done properly before expending CERCLA funds.
Thus, those same persons could be recipients of an order issued under § 106(a). See
United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 839
(W.D. Mo. 1984); United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1113
(D. Minn. 1982); United States v. Outboard Marine Corp., 556 F. Supp. 54, 57 (N.D.
11. 1982). Contra United States v. Wade, 546 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (court
refused to find that § 106 applied to nonnegligent parties that had been offsite genera-
tors but were no longer generating hazardous wastes), appeal dismissed, 713 F.2d 49 (3d
Cir. 1983).
The EPA, however, takes the position that it is possible to issue orders to parties
other than those listed in § 107(a) if such action is necessary to protect the public or the
environment. See United States v. Outboard Marine Corp., 556 F. Supp. 54, 56 (N.D.
I1. 1982); Thomas & Price, supra note 11, at 5.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1982).
17. Id. § 9631. This $1.6 billion fund is derived from taxes on crude oil and chemi-
cal feedstock and from general revenues.
18. Id. § 9604(a)(1).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
20. 575 F. Supp. 248 (D.N.J. 1983).
21. Id. at 250. In addition, plaintiffs sought a declaration that if they contributed to
the cost of the cleanup, they would be compensated under § 107(a)(4)(B). Id. See infra
note 73.
1987]
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the plaintiffs. The EPA advised the plaintiffs, in a notice letter, that
they might be a responsible party with respect to the site. In addition,
the EPA informed the plaintiffs that they could be liable under section
107 of CERCLA for all costs incurred by the government in connnec-
tion with the site.2 2 The district court dismissed the action, finding
that the notice letter was not a definitive statement of position and
therefore not "final" agency action.23 Consequently, plaintiffs could
not challenge cleanup cost liability because liability had not yet been
imposed.24
In Cotter v. EPA25 the plaintiff objected to the EPA's informal deci-
sion to include a particular site on the National Priorities List because
the EPA failed to consult with the State of Colorado. The court, how-
ever, summarily held that the agency action was not ripe for review.26
In another controversy, Wickland Oil Terminals v. ASARCO, Inc.,2
7
plaintiff landowner did not challenge an informal decision made by the
EPA. Rather, plaintiff, the owner of a newly discovered hazardous
waste site, sought relief from the former owner after the EPA placed
the site on the California Department of Health Services (DOHS) haz-
22. 575 F. Supp. at 250.
23. Id. at 252. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides in pertinent
part: "Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which
there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review. A prelimi-
nary, procedural or intermediate agency action or ruling not directly reviewable is sub-
ject to review on the review of the final agency action." 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1982).
Because CERCLA does not expressly provide that notice letters are reviewable, it is
important under the APA to determine whether EPA action is "final" or "prelimi-
nary." The court found that a notice letter represented only a threshold determination.
Thus, further inquiry into the liability of each party was warranted. The court found
this situation analogous to Federal Trade Comm'n v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232,
239-42 (1980) (FTC complaint stating that the agency had "reason to believe" the
named parties had violated the Federal Trade Commission Act did not constitute "final
agency action").
Other justifications for granting judicial review only after "final agency action" in-
clude allowing the EPA the opportunity to correct its mistakes, Standard Oil, 449 U.S.
at 242, and preserving scarce investigative and prosecutorial resources, Dresser Indus.,
Inc. v. United States, 596 F.2d 1231, 1236 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1044
(1980). For a more detailed discussion of "final agency action," see infra note 34.
24. D'Imperio, 575 F. Supp. at 153.
25. Cotter v. EPA, 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2231, 2232 (D. Colo. 1984).
26. Id. In a separate claim plaintiffs charged that the EPA unlawfully expended
Superfund money for investigation. The court held that even though there may ulti-
mately be a cost recovery action, plaintiff did not have any special interest in challeng-
ing expenditures. Id.
27. 590 F. Supp. 72 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
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ardous waste site list. The court held that the mere placement of the
site on the DOHS hazardous waste site list was insufficient to create a
live controversy.2" The placement, the court noted, did not assure that
the DOHS would seek enforcement.29
III. COURT INJUNCTION
When the EPA files suit to require a third party to take appropriate
cleanup action under section 106(a), judicial review is not an issue be-
cause the EPA brings the controversy to the court system. This
method, however, is very time consuming.3 0 The discovery process
alone can be very complex and take years to complete. After years of
delay in several cases, the EPA has abandoned this method in favor of
one of the other statutory alternatives discussed below.3"
IV. EPA ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER AND
PRE-ENFORCEMENT REVIEW
The EPA can use a second option under section 106(a) of CERCLA
and issue an administrative order directing a responsible party to take
necessary cleanup action.32 Before issuing an administrative order,
however, the EPA must determine that "an imminent and substantial
28. Id. at 76.
29. Id. See also S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 60 (1980) ("The priority lists
serve primarily informational purposes.... Inclusion of a facility or site on the list does
not in itself reflect a judgment of the activities of its owner or operator ... nor does it
assign liability to any person.").
Plaintiffs also sought reimbursement for costs in testing the site. The court found
that an authorized governmental cleanup initiated by the EPA or by state authorities
pursuant to a cooperative agreement must be commenced before a private party can
state a damages claim under CERCLA. 590 F. Supp. at 77.
30. For a more complete discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of judi-
cially ordered cleanup, see Anderson, supra note 5, at 304-06 (lawsuits provide the gov-
ernment with "strong precedents for use in future mandatory cleanup and cost
recoupment actions").
31. See United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 606 F. Supp. 412 (D. Minn.
1985) (EPA dropped suit and issued administrative cleanup order); United States v.
Outboard Marine Corp., 104 F.R.D. 405, 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1124 (N.D. Ill.
1984) ("[a]fter several years of litigation, however, the United States has decided to
clean the Harbor up by itself").
32. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1982). The EPA calls this "one of the most potent admin-
istrative remedies available to the Agency under any existing environmental statute."
Thomas & Price, supra note 11, at 3. Attorneys who represent companies subject to
these orders have expressed concern about the nature of this power. See Light, A De-
fense Counsel's Perspective on Superfund, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,203
1987]
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endangerment may exist."33 After reviewing the administrative order
procedure, courts have universally found that Congress did not intend
the EPA determination to be subject to immediate judicial review.34
(1985); Rogers, Companies Fear Sweeping Superfund Cleanup Order, Legal Times, June
18, 1984, at 11, col. 1.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1982). This section provides in part:
In addition to any other action taken by a State or local government, when the
President determines that there may be an imminent and substantial endangerment
to the public health or welfare or the environment because of an actual or
threatened release of hazardous substance from a facility .... The President may
... take other action under this section including, but not limited to, issuing such
orders as may be necessary to protect public health and welfare and the
environment.
Id. (emphasis added).
For a definition of "imminent and substantial endangerment," see United States v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 846 (W.D. Mo. 1984);
United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1109-10 (D. Minn.
1982). Because neither CERCLA nor its legislative history specifically define this
phrase, both of these cases cited the House Committee Report accompanying § 1431 of
the Safe Water Drinking Act. The Report states in part:
In using the words "imminent and substantial endangerment to the health of
persons," the Committee intends that this broad administrative authority not be
used when the system of regulatory authorities provided elsewhere in the bill could
be used adequately to protect the public health. Nor is the emergency authority to
be used in cases where the risk of harm is remote in time, completely speculative in
nature, or de minimis in degree. However, as in the case of U.S. v. United States
Steel, Civ. Act No. 71-1041 (N.D. Ala. 1971), under the Clean Air Act, the Com-
mittee intends that this language be construed by the courts and the Administrator
so as to give paramount importance to the objective of protection of the public
health....
Furthermore, while the risk of harm must be "imminent" for the Administrator
to act, the harm itself need not be. Thus, for example, the Administrator may
invoke this section when there is an imminent likelihood of the introduction into
drinking water of contaminants that may cause health damage after a period of
latency.
H.R. REP. No. 1185, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 35-36, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CON(. &
ADmiN. NEWS 6454, 6487-88. See also Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 451 F.2d 1, 13 (D.C. Cir.)
(endangerment amounts to less than actual harm) cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976);
Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 529 (8th Cir. 1975), modified, 529 F.2d 181
(8th Cir. 1976); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 597
(D.C. Cir. 1971) ("a hazard may be 'imminent' even if its impact will not be apparent
for many years").
Section 106(a) is one of several imminent hazard provisions that Congress has in-
cluded in environmental statutes. See § 7003 of the Resource Conservation and Recov-
ery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (1982); § 1431 of the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 3001(a) (1982); § 504(a) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1364(a) (1982); § 303 of
the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7603 (1982).
34. See Wagner Elec. Corp. v. Thomas, 612 F. Supp. 736, 738 (D. Kan. 1985);
United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 606 F. Supp. 412, 418 n.2 (D. Minn. 1985);
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Judicial review is not available even when responsible parties fail to
challenge the EPA directly.3 5 For example, in Earthline Co. v. Kin-
Aminoil, Inc. v. EPA, 599 F. Supp. 69, 71 (C.D. Cal. 1984). Courts have found legisla-
tive intent in CERCLA's legislative history to preclude judicial review. See Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967). Courts cite the following House
Report passage with regularity: "The Committee recognizes that emergency action will
often be required prior to the receipt of evidence which conclusively establishes an
emergency. Because delay will often exacerbate an already serious situation, the bill
authorizes the Administrator to take action when an imminent and substantial endan-
germent may exist." H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 28, reprinted in 1980
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6131. The general guidelines for issuance of
EPA orders is as follows:
mhe Administrator may by order require a responsible party to take such reme-
dial action. Prior to issuing an order, however, the Administrator must confer
with the responsible party as to the reasonableness of the order, which should
clearly set forth reviewable standards governing its issuance Judicial review of such
an order would not preclude the Administrator from taking appropriate action.
Id. (emphasis added).
In addition to court decisions, proposed legislation rejects judicial review of § 106(a)
orders. See S. REP. No. 11, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 58, 115 (1985). The proposal
provides:
No court shall have jurisdiction to review any challenges to response action se-
lected under section 104 or any order issued under section 104, or to review any
order issued under section 106(a), in any action other than (1) an action under
section 107 to recover response costs or damages or for contribution or indemnifi-
cation; (2) an action to enforce an order issued under sections 104 or 106(a) or to
recover a penalty for violation of such order; or (3) an action for reimbursement
under section 106(b)(2).
Id. at 115.
For arguments advocating judicial review, see Anderson, Negotiation and Informal
Agency Action: The Case of Superfund, ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES 263, 305-09 (1984); Note, supra note 3, at 712 n.40.
Despite virtually unanimous court decisions and the potential amendments, the abil-
ity to attack the constitutionality of CERCLA penalties for non-compliance with ad-
ministrative orders does provide some pre-enforcement judicial review. See infra notes
43-71 and accompanying text. The result can cause litigation delays and can force the
EPA to expend Superfund money to clean up the site itself. See Solid State Circuits Inc.
v. EPA, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1758 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
35. A comparison of § 106(a) with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982 & Supp. III 1985), provides helpful insight.
Under RCRA the EPA may issue an administrative order under both § 3013, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6934 (1982), and § 7003, 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (1982). Section 3013 provides that the
EPA may order the owner or operator of a facility to conduct monitoring, analysis, and
testing to ascertain the nature and extent of a hazard. Section 7003 is an all-purpose
provision similar to § 106(a) of CERCLA.
One court indicated that there may be judicial review of an RCRA administrative
order issued under § 3013. See E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Daggett, 610 F.
Supp. 260 (W.D.N.Y. 1985). Under the authority of§ 3013 the EPA directed the plain-
tiff in Daggett to develop and submit to the EPA an evaluation plan with respect to
1987]
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Buc Inc.,36 the EPA issued an order that was binding on eleven persons
named jointly and severally as respondents. The order did not specifi-
cally assign certain tasks to each respondent. Instead, the order simply
made each respondent responsible for performing every task. 7 Unable
to agree on a coordinated plan for cleanup, the parties sought a clarifi-
cation of their rights and obligations. The court held that issuance of
the order alone did not constitute final agency action under section 704
of the Administrative Procedure Act.3" Thus, the Earthline court es-
tablished the rights and liabilities of parties under the EPA order only
after initiation of an EPA enforcement proceeding.39
The combination of CERCLA's joint and several liability and the
EPA's unwillingness to assign specific cleanup tasks creates a major
dilemma for multiple respondents with respect to administrative or-
ders.4' Each respondent must consider a number of factors, including
groundwater monitoring wells at a landfill site. Id. Both the EPA and plaintiff con-
strued § 3013 to preclude judicial review because they interpreted it as analogous to
§ 106(a) of CERCLA. Id. at 2078. Consequently, plaintiff argued that RCRA was
unconstitutional because of the lack of judicial review and sought a preliminary injunc-
tion. Id. at 2076. The court held that the emergency rationale for precluding review
under § 106 of CERCLA was absent with respect to § 3013 ofRCRA. Id. at 2078. The
court noted that the EPA can issue an administrative order under § 3013 as a prevent-
ative tool unrelated to an imminent and substantial endangerment. The court, there-
fore, found it unlikely that Congress intended to foreclose pre-enforcement review of
EPA orders under § 3013. Id.
This finding suggests that judicial review should depend on the nature of the CER-
CLA administrative order. For example, if the order is analogous to a § 3013 order
under RCRA, judicial review could be justified. Even though the situation might tech-
nically meet the liberal "imminent and substantial endangerment" test, the emergency
justification would be weaker. Thus, the due process interests of the respondent might
outweigh the EPA's interests in testing the site.
Judicial review is also available under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7420(b)(4)(B),
and the Surface Mining Control & Reclamation Act of 1978, 30 U.S.C. § 1268(b). See,
e.g., B & M Coal v. Office of Surface Mining Reclamation, 531 F. Supp. 677 (S.D. Ind.
1982), aff'd, 699 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1983).
36. 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2157 & 2161 (D.N.J. 1984).
37. Id. at 2158.
38. Id. at 2161.
39. Id. at 2162. See supra note 22 for text and discussion of the pertinent APA
section.
40. See Light, supra note 32, at 10,207. Light states:
[Tihe government wants to have the widest array of potential defendants, each
liable for all cleanup costs, ensuring that parties can be tapped to pay for the entire
cleanup whenever the government decides-on whatever basis it decides-to pick
them. In essence, this amounts to a headlong rush after the deep pocket, without
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the financial condition of the other respondents41 and the ability of the
group to agree on the distribution of cleanup responsibilities. Without
judicial or administrative review of the EPA's cleanup order,42 these
factors create a great deal of uncertainty and make informed business
decisions difficult.
Even without multiple party complications, a potentially responsible
party that receives an EPA order to initiate cleanup activity at a haz-
ardous waste site can find itself in a very difficult position. Refusal to
comply with the administrative order may subject the party to the pen-
alties contained in CERCLA.43 The penalties for non-compliance
range up to 5,000 dollars per day with punitive damages up to three
times the amount of cleanup costs.44
Yet, consider the alternative. A party complying with an order is
not entitled to seek reimbursement from the federal government even if
the complying party subsequently establishes its lack of responsibility
in court. The party's sole remedy is to identify the responsible party
and seek reimbursement from that party.45 Proposed legislation, if en-
particular regard for degree of involvement or for any earlier payment of CERCLA
taxes.
Id. Even the EPA acknowledges the problem. See Thomas & Price, supra note 11, at 6
("In a large group of responsible parties, it may be difficult for the group to develop a
consensus on individual liability and perform response activities as quickly as necessary
to abate imminent hazard conditions at the site.").
41. See infra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
42. In an attempt to save the parties from themselves, the Earthline court exercised
its equitable powers and equally divided the costs of cleanup, until it could make the
proper factual findings at an evidentiary hearing after cleanup. 21 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) at 2161.
43. See, e.g., Aminoil, Inc. v. EPA, 599 F. Supp. 69, 73 (C.D. Cal. 1984). The
Aminoil court stated that
[n]othing in the statute precludes EPA from waiting an extended period of time
before bringing an enforcement action. If the alleged responsible parties unsuccess-
fully challenge the administrative order in the enforcement action, the daily penal-
ties will have accrued between the time of the responsible parties' noncompliance
with the order and the actual enforcement proceeding.
Id. See also Wagner Elec. Corp. v. Thomas, 612 F. Supp. 736, 739 (D. Kan. 1985)
(because CERCLA requires no administrative hearing before the EPA issues a cleanup
order, a responsible party's liability for daily penalties and punitive damages may accrue
prior to any administrative or judicial hearing).
44. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606(b), 9607(c)(3).
45. See Aminoil, 599 F. Supp. at 73-74; Wagner Elec., 612 F. Supp. at 742. The
Wagner Electric court noted that potentially responsible plaintiffs often face the choice
of either failing to comply and facing massive liability, or complying and virtually aban-
doning any hope of recovering funds spent on cleanup activities for which they were not
1987]
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acted, would rectify this problem.46
Confronted with this awkward choice, respondents to an administra-
tive order must allege that the statutory structure obstructs the right to
judicial review by allowing civil penalties to accrue before any opportu-
nity for a hearing.47 Parties have argued that when the EPA seeks
judicial enforcement of an administrative cleanup order, the high pen-
alties resulting from a losing court battle encourage a potentially re-
sponsible party to comply with the order. Therefore the statutory
penalties eliminate the opportunity for judicial review at any stage.48
In Aminoil, Inc. v. EPA4 9 the court found that the statutory struc-
ture obstructed the availability of judicial review. The district court
responsible. Id. See also United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 606 F. Supp. 412,
416 (D. Minn. 1985) (stating that a party who complies with an EPA order has no
meaningful opportunity to test the order's merits).
46. See proposed amendment to § 106(b)(2), S. REP. No. 11, 99th Cong., Ist Sess.
100 (1985):
(A)Any person who receives and complies with the terms of any order issued under
subsection (a) may, within sixty days of completion of the required action, petition
the President for reimbursement from the Fund for the reasonable costs of such
action, plus interest.... (C) To obtain reimbursement, the petitioner must establish
by a preponderance of the evidence that it is not liable for response costs under
section 107(a) and that costs for which it seeks reimbursement are reasonable in
light of the action required by the relevant order....
47. See Wagner Elec., 612 F. Supp. at 74243; Reilly Tar, 606 F. Supp. at 417;
Aminoil, 599 F. Supp. at 75.
48. Two Supreme Court decisions recognized and set forth the due process concerns
surrounding the lack of any real judicial review opportunity. See Ex parte Young, 209
U.S. 123 (1908) (Court held state statutes establishing maximum rail rates and provid-
ing large penalties, including imprisonment, for violation constitutionally invalid be-
cause responsible parties had been given no viable opportunity to contest validity of the
rates); Oklahoma Operating Co. v. Love, 252 U.S. 331 (1920) (Court found no opportu-
nity for judicial review of a state agency order because judicial review burdened with the
possibility of high fines and imprisonment does not satisfy constitutional requirements).
Subsequent decisions acknowledged that the opportunity for judicial review is a due
process right, but held that the companies had not availed themselves of an opportunity
to challenge the government agency. See, e.g., St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368
U.S. 208 (1961) (fixed statutory forfeitures of $100 per day for failure to file special
reports in compliance with FTC orders not invalid when petitioner did not try to obtainjudicial review prior to commencement of the Government's penalty action, and peti-
tioner did not seek a stay once litigation had begun); St. Louis, Iron Mountain & South-
ern Ry. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63 (1919) (railroad company did not take advantage of its
opportunity to challenge the validity of new rates); Wadley Southern Ry. v. Georgia,
235 U.S. 651 (1915) (when state railroad commission joint rate order was made after
hearing and carrier did not avail itself of a safe, adequate, and available statutory judi-
cial review, statute authorizing a $5,000 per day penalty for violation was not invalid).
49. 599 F. Supp. 69 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
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noted that the penalty provisions of sections 106(b) and 107(c)(3) do
not apply to a party demonstrating sufficient cause for non-compliance
with an administrative order.50 After examining the legislative his-
tory," however, the court narrowly construed "sufficient cause." The
court found that "sufficient cause" does not apply to situations in
which an alleged responsible party asserts a reasonable and good faith
defense that the court ultimately rejects.52 Thus, the court held that
the statutory structure coerced plaintiffs into foregoing their legal chal-
lenge to the administrative order. The court then enjoined the accrual
of the CERCLA penalties.53
50. Id. at 73. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(3) (1982) provides in part:
If any person who is liable for a release or threat of release of a hazardous sub-
stance fails without sufficient cause to properly provide removal or remedial action
upon order of the President pursuant to section 9604 or 9606 of this title, such
person may be liable to the United States for punitive damages in an amount at
least equal to, and not more than three times, the amount of any costs....
Id. (emphasis added).
51. SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, A LEGISLATIVE His-
TORY OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENT RESPONSE, COMPENSATION AND LIA-
BILITY ACT OF 1980, Part 1, at 770-71 (1983) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
Senator Stafford, commenting on the sufficient cause requirement, stated:
We intend that the phrase "sufficient cause" would encompass defenses such as
the defense that the person who was the subject of the President's order was not the
party responsible under the act for the release of the hazardous substance. It
would certainly be unfair to assess punitive damages against a party who for good
reason believed himself not to be the responsible party. For example, if there were,
at the time of the order, substantial facts in question, or if the party subject to the
order was not a substantial contributor to the release or threatened release, puni-
tive damages should either not be assessed or should be reduced in the interest of
equity. There could also be "sufficient cause" for not complying with an order if
the party subject to the order did not at the time have the financial or technical
resources to comply or if no technological means for complying was available.
We also intend that the President's orders, and the expenditures for which a
person might be liable for punitive damages, must have been valid. In particular,
they must not be inconsistent with the national contingency plan and must in the
President's belief, have been required ir order to protect the public health or wel-
fare or the environment. Thus, in deciding whether a person should be liable for
punitive damages, we would expect the courts to examine the particular orders or
expenditures from the fund to determine whether they were proper, given the stan-
dards of the act and of the national contingency plan, taking into account the fact
that a threat to the public was posed by the situation sought to be corrected. If the
orders or expenditures were not proper, then certainly no punitive damages should
be assessed or they should be proportionate to the demands of equity.
Id. at 770-71.
52. 599 F. Supp. at 73.
53. Id. at 72-75.
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Two other courts, however, reached the opposite result and refused
to enjoin CERCLA penalties. These courts relied on the existence of a
"good faith" defense54 to an administrative order and the discretionary
character of the civil penalties. 5 In United States v. Reilly Tar &
Chemical Corp.56 the court disagreed with the Aminoil decision and
held that the "sufficient cause" defense should be interpreted liberally.
After reexamining the legislative history, the court interpreted the
''sufficient cause" defense to include a good faith challenge to the cost
effectiveness of an EPA order. 7 Another district court decision, Wag-
ner Electric Corp. v. Thomas, 8 found that courts should liberally inter-
pret "sufficient cause" to refuse compliance with an administrative
order. 9 The court agreed not to penalize a party that could show any
"good faith" defense.60
Wagner Electric is significant because the district court addressed
particular public policy considerations.61 In the opinion's "caveat"
section, the court speculated that respondents to EPA cleanup orders
have some basis for a good faith defense. Courts, therefore, rarely as-
sess the treble damages penalty under section 107.62 Because this pen-
54. In Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440 (1964), taxpayers' attorneys sought declara-
tory and injunctive relief on the invalidity of internal revenue commissioner's summons.
The court stated that "[$t is true that any person summoned who 'neglects to appear or
to produce' may be prosecuted under § 7210 [of the Internal Revenue Code] and is
subject to a fine.... However, this statute on its face does not apply where the witness
appears and interposes good faith challenges to the summons." Id. at 446-47.
55. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
56. 606 F. Supp. 412 (D. Minn. 1985).
57. Id. at 420. Senator Stafford stated that a respondent may allege that the admin-
istrative order is "inconsistent with the national contingency plan." LEGISLATIVE His-
TORY, supra fiote 51, at 771. The Reilly Tar court noted that cost effectiveness is an
integral part of the national contingency plan. 606 F. Supp. at 420. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 9605(2), (7) (1982) and 40 C.F.R. § 300.680) (1986).
58. 612 F. Supp. 736 (D. Kan. 1985).
59. The court defined "good faith" or "sufficient cause" as any "reasonable ground
to contest." Id. at 743-45.
60. Id. at 745. Without this interpretation, the court noted that the burden on
plaintiff's access to due process might be constitutionally invalid. In response, the court
invoked a Supreme Court admonition: "If a [particular] construction of the statute is
fairly possible by which a serious doubt of constitutionality may be avoided, a court
should adopt that construction. In particular, this Court has been willing to assume a
congressional solicitude for fair procedure, absent explicit statutory language to the con-
trary." Id. (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 693 (1979)); see also Reilly
Tar, 606 F. Supp. at 419 n.3.




alty is not a significant threat to noncompliance, a party has much less
incentive to comply with the cleanup order and may wait for judicial
enforcement. Consequently, the administrative order loses its effective-
ness as a means of ensuring prompt hazardous waste cleanup.6 3 The
Wagner Electric court noted that advocating a good faith standard
might act to undermine Congress' intent in enacting CERCLA.64 In
summary, the Wagner Electric court found CERCLA constitutionally
valid by upholding an individual's due process right to a good faith
defense for noncompliance with an EPA administrative order. The
court recognized, however, that acknowledging the good faith defense
creates an obstacle to prompt cleanup of hazardous waste.
In a proposed remedy to this dilemma, the Wagner Electric court
advised the EPA to grant an administrative hearing to respondent.
65
The court suggested that if the EPA presented persuasive evidence of
that party's "responsibility" at the hearing, the "reviewing court would
be far less likely to accept a party's contention that its challenge to an
EPA order was asserted in objective good faith.",66
The Wagner Electric court attempted to create a compromise in the
due process dilemma surrounding judicial review of EPA cleanup stan-
dards under CERCLA. This compromise is effective when respon-
dent's "good faith" contention challenges its status as a responsible
party under CERCLA. As the court recognized, CERCLA clearly es-
tablishes which parties are responsible for hazardous waste releases.67
The EPA, therefore, has the opportunity to present clear and persua-
sive evidence concerning the parties' status as a responsible party at the
administrative hearing.
In contrast, if a respondent challenges the cost effectiveness of an
EPA cleanup order, 68 the issue at the administrative hearing would not
be so clear. Any challenge to an order's cost effectiveness involves a
detailed technical analysis of the EPA investigation and a feasibility
study of the hazardous waste site. During this process, the EPA must
produce and defend studies demonstrating the technical feasibility and





67. Id. Section 107 is a very broad section. See infra note 73 for pertinent text of
this section.
68. See Reilly Tar, 606 F. Supp. at 420-21.
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introduce information showing the degree of risk to public health and
welfare and the environment presented by the particular site.
Although the EPA will have previously compiled this evidence,69 the
mere existence of complex evidentiary issues at an administrative hear-
ing creates at least two significant problems. First, an administrative
hearing is time consuming. Second, if the issues are complex the EPA
will have more difficulty presenting the "persuasive" evidence Wagner
Electric requires to eliminate the respondent's good faith defense.
Despite these problems, the EPA should grant an administrative
hearing to respondents who challenge a cleanup order.70 If the issues
are complex the administrative hearing provides a practical and effi-
cient setting for their resolution. Administrative law judges have better
expertise and understanding of the issues." Thus, the administrative
procedure takes less time than a federal court challenge and helps to
narrow the issues confronting administrative judges. Finally, EPA
cleanup orders will lose their effectiveness if courts become reluctant to
impose CERCLA penalties. The administrative hearing will protect
against this result.
V. EPA CLEANUP AND PRE-EXPENDITURE REVIEW
After determining that a party will not comply with a judicial or
administrative order, the EPA can expend Superfund money to remedy
the situation.72 After the EPA completes the cleanup activity, it can
seek reimbursement from a responsible party under section 107.73
In situations similar to the EPA's issuance of an administrative or-
der, the courts hold that Congress did not intend to permit judicial
review until completion of the cleanup. Judicial review is available
69. See Price & Thomas, EPA Memorandum on Cost Recovery Actions Under CER-
CLA, reprinted in [Federal Laws] Env't Rep. (BNA) 41:2861 (1983).
70. Some commentators highlight the benefits of an administrative hearing. See
Anderson, supra note 5, at 306; Note, supra note 3, at 712 n.40.
71. See generally Freedman, Expertise and the Administrative Process 28 ADMIN. L.
REV. 363 (1976).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (1982). Congress may have intended that EPA Superfund
cleanup would be the heart of CERCLA. Throughout its life, however, Superfund has
never been sufficient to effectively finance a significant percentage of potentially hazard-
ous waste sites in the United States. See United States v. Wade, 546 F. Supp. 785, 793
n.22 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Anderson, supra note 5, at 301-04 (there are other problems with
cleanup by Superfund, including coordinating actions with state agencies and control-
ling "government" costs).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982). Section 107(a) provides in part:
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only when the government seeks reimbursement for cleanup expenses
from responsible parties.74 The courts consistently hold that plaintiffs'
ability to raise all objections to an EPA action in a subsequent cost
recovery suit limits due process concerns.
75
In J. V Peters & Co. v. RuckelshauS76 the district court found a lim-
ited right to judicial review when the EPA's actions are arbitrary and
capricious. 7 Rejecting the district court's reasoning, the court of ap-
peals relied heavily on a 1985 Senate Report and a proposed CERCLA
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the de-
fenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section-
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel... or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned
or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal
or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treat-
ment, of hazardous substances...
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport
to disposal or treatment facilities ... shall be liable for-
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Gov-
ernment or a State not inconsistent with the national contingency plan... (B) any
other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with the
national contingency plan....
Id. See Price & Thomas, supra note 69, at 41:2861. Courts have found that § 107
imposes strict liability on responsible parties. See U.S. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical
& Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 844 (W.D. Mo. 1984); Bulk Distrib. Centers Inc. v.
Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1443 n.15 (S.D. Fla. 1984).
74. See J.V. Peters & Co. v. Administrator, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
20,646 (6th Cir. 1985); Lone Pine Steering Comm. v. EPA, 600 F. Supp. 1487 (D.N.J.),
aff'd, 777 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1985). In Lone Pine plaintiffs alleged that the EPA violated
CERCLA because it proceeded with its own cleanup plan even though a committee of
responsible parties was willing to clean the site properly. The court, however, found
that the committee's letter purportedly offering to clean up the site was "a masterpiece
of studied avoidance of commitment." Id. at 1496. The letter and the potentially
lengthy process of getting all 140 responsible parties to share the financial responsibility
were "suggestive of the bog into which courts would descend if CERCLA were inter-
preted to permit potentially responsible parties to obtain judicial review." Id. See also
United States v. Outboard Marine Corp., 104 F.R.D. 405, 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)
1124 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
75. See Lone Pine, 600 F. Supp. at 1498-99 ("I see no reason why plaintiffs cannot
raise as a defense in a cost recovery action every objection to the ROD which could
legitimately raise in a judicial proceeding at this time."); J. V Peters, 15 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,647-48 ("They can suffer no deprivation until the adjudication of
the section 107 litigation, however, and they will have full opportunity to argue liability
at that time.").
76. 584 F. Supp. 1005 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
77. Id. at 1010. The court stated that "if the owner or operator of a waste facility
averred that the EPA had absolutely no rational basis for undertaking a response action
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amendment to find that Congress did not intend pre-enforcement judi-
cial review of EPA action.7" The proposed amendment expressly al-
lows judicial review only when the government seeks cost recovery.7 9
The Senate committee noted that this amendment recognizes that "pre-
enforcement review would be a significant obstacle to the implementa-
tion of response actions. .. . Pre-enforcement review would lead to
considerable delay in providing cleanups, would increase response
costs, and would discourage settlements and voluntary cleanups."8"
In Industrial Park Development Co. v. EPA 8 the EPA On-Site Coor-
dinator (OSC) 2 unilaterally determined that the Industrial Park De-
velopment Company was not properly completing a private removal
plan. The OSC decided the EPA would enter and clean up the site.8"
Noting the significant delegation of authority to the OSC, the district
court questioned the constitutionality of CERCLA. The court stated
that it had "grave doubts about the constitutionality of delegating to a
variety of administration officials statutory authorization for depriva-
tion of property without prior notice and hearing or prompt subse-
quent administrative or judicial review."8 4
and that no preliminary assessment had been made, a federal court would entertain the
claim." Id.
78. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,646 (6th Cir. 1985).
79. See supra note 34.
80. S. REP. No. 11, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1985).
81. 604 F. Supp. 1136 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
82. 40 C.F.R. § 300.6 (1986) defines the OSC as an official designated to coordinate
and direct federal responses under the national contingency plan.
83. 604 F. Supp. at 1142.
84. Id. at 1141. In addition, the court distinguished Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min-
ing & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981), in which the Supreme Court upheld the
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act. Under that statute, a prompt post-depri-
vation hearing was an integral part of the emergency power and the authority to halt
mining operations was not further delegated to such a low level federal official. Id. at
303.
In Industrial Park the EPA issued an order pursuant to § 106(a) directing Industrial
Park Development Company (IPDC) to submit and implement a plan to clean up a site.
604 F. Supp. at 1138. IPDC did not bind itself to the terms of the order, but it did hire
an independent consultant to prepare and execute a plan for the removal of waste from
the site. Id. at 1139. The OSC orally agreed to phase I of the plan, but objected to
phase II because of the timetable. Id. at 1140. After objecting to the revised plan on
essentially the same grounds, the OSC advised IPDC that the EPA would undertake its
own cleanup action. Id. After several more brief extensions, the EPA rejected a newly
revised plan essentially because IPDC "failed to move up all activities by four days; they
extended an agreed on two day tanker cleanup activity to three days,... they did not
include the agreed to additional PCB testing; and they deleted the bulk solids testing
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol31/iss1/15
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In a factually analogous case, Outboard Marine Corp. v. Thomas, 5
the EPA acted pursuant to an ex parte warrant to take a sizable tract of
property that was not claimed to be contaminated. The Sixth Circuit
held that unless an emergency exists, the EPA has no authority under
CERCLA to enter private property that is not part of the hazard.86
Although the court did not reach the due process issues addressed in
Industrial Park, it did not reject plaintiffs assertion that constitutional
restraints and the principles of eminent domain restrain the EPA's
cleanup activities.8 7 Even if Congress amended CERCLA to permit
this type of EPA action in non-emergency situations, the constitutional
due process issue raised in Industrial Park might prevent this depriva-
tion without a prompt post-deprivation hearing.
VI. JUDICIAL REVIEW FOR THE PUBLIC
Congress intended the EPA to encourage public participation
throughout the entire hazardous waste site evaluation and cleanup pro-
cess.88 The right of a citizen group to seek judicial review of an EPA
administrative cleanup order or EPA cleanup plan has yet to be liti-
gated. To a certain extent, the private right of action for citizen groups
under CERCLA diminishes their need and authority to challenge EPA
cleanup decisions.89 A community or public interest group that can
from the analysis schedule." Id. Over IPDC's objections, the OSC conducted an EPA
cleanup at the site. Id. Despite the likelihood of success on the merits, the court denied
IPDC's motion for a preliminary injunction because there was no showing of irrepara-
ble injury. Id. at 1145. The site was vacant and there were no pending plans for its
lease or development. Id. at 1144.
85. 773 F.2d 883 (7th Cir. 1985). After years of litigation, the EPA abandoned the
attempt to have plaintiffs clean up the site and initiated its own response. Id. at 885.
Through an ex parte warrant, the EPA attempted to gain access to the property for a
phase I action, including a "walk-through" visit of 16 persons and 7 vehicles, a survey,
and 23 subsurface borings that would require 17 people and 16 vehicles. Id. The opera-
tion would require about 1000 square feet of the plaintiff's parking lots and the eventual
full scale operation would occupy six acres. Id.
86. Id. at 890. The EPA did not contend that this was an emergency situation.
Rather, the court stated that "[t]here is no imminent and substantial endangerment to
the public health or welfare or the environment because of an actual or threatened re-
lease of a hazardous substance. If there is an emergency, it is almost ten years old." Id.
at 886.
87. Id. at 888.
88. See 42 U.S.C. § 9605(9) (1982); 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.24, 300.61(c)(3).
89. The courts have found an implied private right of action in 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(4)(B) (1982). For decisions establishing the private right of action, see Wells
v. Waste Resource Corp., 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1785 (6th Cir. 1985); Levin Metals
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initiate investigation or hazardous waste cleanup has less need to force
EPA action.9" In addition, the EPA policy of soliciting comment dur-
ing public hearings on a particular waste site also lessens the need for
formal judicial review. 91
In Lone Pine Steering Committee v. EPA92 plaintiffs argued that the
lack of judicial review deprives the public of any opportunity to chal-
lenge EPA decisions. Plaintiffs alleged that without judicial review the
public lacks a remedy even if the EPA response action is patently inad-
equate.93 Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that the public does not have
the opportunity for review in a post hoe proceeding. The district court
explained that the statute may contemplate a different rule of judicial
review with respect to victims of a hazardous waste site. 94 Although
the statute was designed particularly to protect these victims, it con-
tains no specific provision for obtaining judicial review.95 The court
recognized that an analysis of the statute "might lead to the conclusion
that Congress intended that the victims have the right to a judicial
Corp. v. Parr-Richmond Terminal Co., 608 F. Supp. 1272 (N.D. Cal. 1985); Bulk Dis-
trib. Centers Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437 (S.D. Fla. 1984); City of Philadel-
phia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1982). Proposed legislation
would expressly codify this private right of action. See S. REP. No. 11, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. 61-62, 119-20 (1985).
The pressure for judicial review of prosecutorial decisions is relieved by the existence
of alternative remedies that enforce the law if the EPA fails to act. See Sunstein, Re-
viewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. Cai. L. REv. 653, 671-72
(1985). It can also be very difficult to challenge an agency without alleging more than
general arbitrariness. Id. at 682. But cf Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckel-
shaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (plaintiffs used EPA findings of dangerousness of
DDT as basis for review of EPA inaction).
90. The EPA, however, opposes language in proposed House and Senate bills that
would grant individual citizens the right to sue government agencies and private compa-
nies to compel cleanup. In the EPA's opinion such a provision would disrupt its efforts
to manage the cleanup process and force the agency to become involved in a large
number of lawsuits, thus diverting resources away from more important activities.
Thomas Cautions Congress Not to Make Significant Changes in Superfund Statute, 16
Env't Rep. (BNA) 1232 (1985).
91. See Lone Pine Steering Comm. v. EPA, 600 F. Supp. 1487, 1492 (D.N.J. 1985).
Proposed legislation would add a new subsection to § 104 that would require an oppor-
tunity for public comment before the federal government or any state selects a particu-
lar remedial action, enters into any settlement agreement, or otherwise disposes of any
claim against any party. See S. REP. No. 11, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 37-38, 97 (1985).
92. 600 F. Supp. 1487 (D.N.L), aff'd, 77 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1985).





review of [an EPA record of decision]."9 6
Despite this encouraging language, the public may not possess any
special rights to challenge EPA cleanup actions. In discussing a pro-
posed citizen suit provision for CERCLA, the Senate noted that the
provision's language clearly indicates "that a citizen suit cannot be
used to seek pre-enforcement judicial review of any remedial action or
enforcement order. This is consistent with the clarification made else-
where in the bill, eliminating pre-enforcement review of administrative
orders."9 7
VII. CONCLUSION
In pending legislation, the Senate expressly denies pre-enforcement
judicial review of EPA decisions.98 Despite the Senate's assertion that
CERCLA affords adequate protection of the due process rights of po-
tentially responsible parties, the Senate bill does not directly address
this constitutional issue.99 In effect, Congress has left the courts with
the difficult task of balancing due process rights of potentially responsi-
ble parties against the statutory purpose of achieving effective cleanup
of hazardous waste. CERCLA, unlike all other significant environ-
mental legislation, does not guarantee a prompt post-deprivation hear-
ing or judicial review. 1" Few people will argue that the EPA has a
significant need to act in emergency situations without the delay caused
by judicial review. If the EPA, however, allows potential emergency
situations to endure for years without taking some kind of action, I"I
the EPA's desire to act free of judicial review may yield to the due
96. Id.
97. S. REP. No. 11, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 62 (1985).
98. See supra note 34 for text of the proposed amendment.
99. S. REP. No. 11, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 58-59 (1985).
100. See supra note 35.
101. See, e.g., Outboard Marine Corp. v. Thomas, 773 F.2d 883 (7th Cir. 1985);
Freedman, supra note 14, at 61. Freedman states that if considerable time is necessary
for an administrative agency to take summary action after the agency is aware of an
unlawful condition, "Congress should consider whether the preliminary injunction pro-
cedure is not the more appropriate method of regulation, since it is difficult to maintain
that an 'emergency' justifying summary action exists in such circumstances." Id. But
ef Lone Pine, 600 F. Supp. at 1498 ("It should be obvious that every day's delay in
dealing with a hazardous site entails risks. Just because unavoidable delays are required
to plan and implement a response does not mean that Congress contemplated the addi-
tional delays which judicial review would entail.").
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process rights of potentially responsible parties.1"2
One possible solution is for Congress and the courts to recognize the
significant differences between a section 106(a) administrative order
and a section 104 EPA cleanup and reimbursement action. Under a
section 106(a) EPA administrative cleanup order no guarantee exists
that the EPA's action will be subject to a prompt post-cleanup hearing
or judicial review.103 In fact, a party that complies with the order se-
verely limits its rights against previous EPA informal action. The
complying party's only remedy is to sue other responsible parties.'
°4
On the other hand, if the party refuses to comply with an order,
there is no guarantee of a quick review by the courts. The EPA may
wait months or years before either seeking judicial enforcement or
cleaning up the site itself. During that time, CERCLA penalties may
accrue and the physical evidence may deteriorate.'15 Congress, there-
fore, should mandate that the EPA provide an administrative hearing
after issuing a section 106(a) order.
In contrast, the justifications for denying immediate judicial or ad-
ministrative review of a section 104 EPA cleanup action are much
stronger. When directed to abate a hazardous threat, the responsible
party feels the financial impact of a section 106(a) administrative order
immediately. When the EPA acts under section 104, however, no ac-
tual property deprivation occurs until after a suit for reimburse-
ment. 1 1 6 The EPA, therefore, can justify deferring judicial review until
that time. 107
Under this proposal, if an emergency situation exists, the EPA could
clean up the site under section 104 without delaying judicial or admin-
istrative hearings. EPA section 104 cleanup action would thereby sat-
isfy the congressional desire for fast, unimpeded action. In those cases
that do not require immediate action, the EPA could act under section
106(a) to grant responsible parties access to an administrative hearing.
Despite Superfund's financial limitations, 10 8 Congress and the courts
102. See supra notes 43-71, 81-87 and accompanying texts.
103. See supra note 43-44 and the accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 45-46 and the accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 43-44 and the accompanying text.
106. But see supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
107. Lone Pine Steering Comm. v. EPA, 777 F.2d 882, 887 (3d Cir. 1985).
108. See supra note 72.
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should carefully reconsider provisions such as section 106(a) that allow
the EPA to act without the threat of judicial review.
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